Some random notes from around the blogosphere:

• Professor Froomkin notes the essentially meaningless opportunity for Hamdi to consult his lawyer, or at least listen to his lawyer (since he wasn't allowed to answer questions).
• Noted without much comment, Phil Carter discusses a bit of the military records issue surrounding George III's service during 1972. I cannot comment because a couple of his remarks impinge on my NDA; but, whether I agree with everything said or not, the post should indicate that there is substantial evidence that could be obtained, if someone would bother to do it. I have even more questions that I would ask—but then, I was a CO in the USAF for much the better part of a decade, so I'm familiar with some USAF/ANG requirements (that would have generated records) that Carter is not.
• A very short followup on one of my earlier posts—the Perfesser notes that California Business and Professions Code § 17200 is a subject "near and dear to [his] heart." As a perhaps-irrelevant point of interest, there is no difference in the Sony case between the legal basis for suit under § 17200 and the correlate laws of 30-odd other states. These are generically referred to as "UDAP" (Uniform Deceptive Acts and Practices) statutes; prominent examples include CUTPA (Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act), the ICFA (Illinois Consumer Fraud Act), and three or four others. The distinction with § 17200 is that California allows a party without a traceable injury to act as a private attorney general. Since the "victims" in the Sony case include several who attended one of the referenced movies on the strength of the advertisements that included the phantom reviews from the phantom reviewers, that's not an issue in this case. Consumers in Illinois, Connecticut, or many other states would have the same ability to file a virtually identical lawsuit—and the "state of residence of the defendant" issue is not relevant; it is a false conflict. See, e.g., Perry v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., et al., 953 F. Supp. 1365, 953 F. Supp. 1371, 953 F. Supp. 1378 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (holding, among other things, that an Illinois corporation could be sued for violating the ICFA in Alabama because any conflict with Alabama law was a false conflict) (and yes, I was the principal counsel for the plaintiff, even if my name appears far down the seniority list; I did the work and developed the theories).