I've given the matter some thought, and the best I can come up with is this: the [Electoral College] system may help counter-balance the wholly undemocratic rule of equal suffrage in the Senate. Smaller states have been, and always will be, over-represented in the Senate. By giving larger states a disproportionate voice in choice of Executive, the Electoral College may check the Senate's own undemocratic nature. This only works if the "large" states allocate all of their electoral votes to the winning candidate in that state. But as Scrivener notes, all of the large states do use a "winner take all" system.
"Our Anti-Democratic Ways" (06 Feb 04). The Catch-22 to this analysis is fairly apparent; although, as I think about it, I'm starting to feel like the Spanish Inquisition…
Our main objection to Yossarian's analysis is that it assumes that the states elect the President, whereas the Constitution contemplates that the voters of the states elect the President. And…
Our two main objections to Yossarian's analysis are that it (1) assumes that the states elect the President, and (2) ignores that the method of selecting Senators has changed radically since the Constitution was ratified (Senators are now elected, not appointed by the state governments). And…
Our three main objections to Yossarian's analysis are that it (1) assumes that the states elect the President, (2) ignores that the method of selecting Senators has changed radically since the Constitution was ratified, and (3) fails to acknowledge that Senators are not bound to vote in any particular manner, and most especially not as a single bloc for each state, whereas Electors (at least in practice) are. And…
Our four main objections to Yossarians analysis are that it (1) assumes that the states elect the President, (2) ignores that the method of selecting Senators has changed radically since the Constitution was ratified, (3) fails to acknowledge that Senators are not bound to vote as a single bloc for each state, and (4) improperly assumes that the means of electing the President under Article II must somehow naturally correlate with the allocation of representation in the legislative branch under Article I (keeping in mind, too, that a fixed size of the House, and therefore virtually fixed size of the Electoral College, is a Constitutionally recent development), thereby undermining one of the most important checks-and-balances aspects of the federal system. And…
The comfy chair, an almost fanatical devotion to the Pope, and the soft cushions. And surprise.
The only internally consistent rationale that I've ever found is that the executive branch is a political branch, but it is supposed to be of intermediary representational value between the wholly elected legislature of Article I (under the fiction that we can use the contemporary election of Senators as a proxy for original intent!) and the wholly unelected judiciary of Article III. Internal consistency, however, is not enough; it is not consistent with the records of the Convention, with contemporary writings, with the "administrative state" model that has developed since sick chickens went off the menu, or with common sense.