Looks like it's morning again in America DC. Too bad I'm a night owl, who spent most of his first career hoping the clock wouldn't reach midnight (notwithstanding the best efforts/worst instincts of the ideology-driven morons in governments across the world). The clock moved a few seconds closer very early this morning. And I have questions.
The rhetoric currently coming out of DC is that the "limited" invasion of Venezuala was intended primarily to "arrest" a "narcoterrorist." I'm not convinced, no matter what the cretins in the Office of Legal Counsel say to rationalize policies reminiscent of previous American experiences in Latin America. At least we didn't have to rely on a third-rate band from California for the actual "apprehension" this time (I'm pretty desperately searching for anything less negative here). That, however, raises a few questions.
1. Making an arrest for a US indictment? Worse, without the cooperation (not just permission) of the nation in which that arrest takes place? On top of that, of the head of state/government, however dubious the process leading to that status? The irony that the real "precedent" for this under US law is Noriega should give one pause — and lead to a lot more questions, in and of itself.
Noriega's status as a federal defendant depended upon converting his initial status as an alleged prisoner of war to a criminal defendant. His status as a "head of state/government" was much more questionable than is President Maduro's (which is certainly questionable enough… but only under the domestic law of Venezuala, which the US has no standing to enforce). The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless rejected Noriega's status-based challenges to his indictment and conviction. US v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997). There's one critical fact in the Noriega matter that is different in the current matter, however: Noriega, acting as head of state of Panama, had declared that Panama and the US were in a state of war prior to the US incursion. (Id. at 1210.) I'm not aware of a corresponding statement from Maduro, making the "prisoner of war" aspect less tenable.
2. But how about that arrest, disregarding Maduro's government status? Here, there's a clear answer in precedent… that is probably wrong as a matter of international law, but is at least questionable; and it is certainly more than just "questionable" regarding any official of a foreign government. The nearly circular reasoning in US v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 (1992) (note that this postdates Noriega's "apprehension" in 1989), provides that precedential rationale. One need not even reference the disfavored-by-this-Administration ICC's detailed, and indeed exhaustive, consideration of these kinds of issues, especially in post-Yugoslavia, to spot the logic problems with Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion; the well-reasoned dissent from Justice Stevens suffices without those pesky non-US-lawyer-supplied arguments.
That said, the current US Supreme Court — due to its excessive, and more extreme than any past Court, deference to "the Executive" on a range of issues — is just not going to repudiate Alvarez-Machain; if offered the opportunity, it would probably extend it. In the abstract, it's a difficult circumstance, because there really isn't an unrestricted-by-national-boundaries "police force" that would ordinarily be the proper "arresting and indicting" authority, by analogy between US federal and US state systems.1 (That's just not how the ICC works, contrary to uniform bloviation by every Heffalump administration to even notice it.) This is sort of the flip side of the (now-disfavored) rationale that "rights imply a remedy" — something like "criminal offenses imply enforcement." Yeah, not so much.
3. Then, too, there are some problems with the mechanics of the "arrest." It appears to have been done by — or, at minimum, substantially assisted by — US military personnel. Given the absence of any prior declaration of hostilities, that's acting as law enforcement. Even if a DEA agent was the one who put the cuffs on:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, or the Space Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (as amended to 2021). Note that there's no territorial restriction here; that it requires authorization by Congress (or explicitly in the Constitution); and that it concerns any execution of "the laws." Absent that Congressional authorization, then, those who "used" military forces for enforcement of civil laws are subject to indictment.2
The "law school exam question" follow-up is whether Congress has the power to retroactively provide the specific "authorization" (leaving aside, for the moment, its at-the-moment-hypothetical inclination to do so). There's certainly more than one way to do so; it could amend Posse Comitatus, it could pass a resolution authorizing military force against Venezuala/its government/its head of state, it could (just short of that last) pass a resolution generally authorizing military force in support of bringing a foreign-located individual to US courts after indictment for a range of offenses including "narcoterrorism."3
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Questions 4 through n are reserved for future consideration. Probably by others who have sufficient current security clearances, and current need to know, and more knowledge about "how the military works" than anyone in the Office of Legal Counsel has demonstrated in the last half-century or more. I can only hope that this particular "police action" doesn't require another granite wall… and gets recognized as a "real conflict" sooner, without any Gulf of Tonkin nonsense. Oops — it's too late for the latter; an accusation of "narcoterrorism," let alone an actual indictment, already puts that in play.
- This is, of course, a vast oversimplification. Just about everything is going to be a vast oversimplification because as yet, we're dealing with the indictment of a ham sandwich — an indictment that is intertwined with both general policy and conflict-of-interest-colored preferences related not to Maduro so much as to Venezualan petroleum. The Monroe Doctrine did not, or at least was not supposed to, mean that while European powers needed to stay out of the hemisphere, the US could intervene however its current Administration desires; and it's all too easy to imagine the US reaction to the equivalent from the People's Republic of China, or
the Duchy of Muscovy Russia, or Iran. Oh, wait, we don't need to imagine it — it's been fairly public over the last couple centuries, and we don't even need to reference pre-Monroe-Doctrine "precedents" in North Africa.
- I think we can agree that this Administration will simply not indict any member of the Administration unless/until it leaves office on 20 January 2029. It appears that the default three-year statute of limitations applies to violations of Posse Comitatus — which will run not later than 03 January 2029. Interesting planning, there… so maybe the Office of Legal Counsel does have some use, as there's a decent probability that there's a classified memo somewhere discussing exactly this issue. Advance attempts to manipulate the statute of limitations in a criminal matter speak loudly that someone, somewhere in the Administration, has something resembling a guilty conscience.
- Bluntly, this last would not be a good idea — resembling, as it does, Soviet and, umm, other practices from the Cold War era. <SARCASM> At least it's not an authorization for assassination, which is at present prohibited via executive order (that can also be rescinded by the executive at whim). Leon Trotsky's ghost would appreciate a quiet word in the corner, away from that vase with the bug in it; and without further comment and only as an exemplary reference if accepted on its own terms, see Roya Hakakian, Assassins of the Turquoise Palace (2011). </SARCASM>